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This article considers the legitimacy of 
political regimes in the Baltic States by analys-
ing three major parameters: confidence in po-
litical institutions, level of corruption, and the 
development of their party systems. The author 
identifies the major crisis trends in the legiti-
macy of the political regimes of Lithuania, Lat-
via, and Estonia. The article stresses the prob-
lem of legitimacy reproduction resulting from 
the limited representation of the national party 
systems. Special attention is paid to compensa-
tory mechanisms used by political elites to ‘ar-
tificially’ reproduce legitimacy. It makes sense 
to analyse the deficit of legitimacy in the Baltic 
States not only in the context of threats to 
democratic institutions but also considering 
weaknesses of public institutions and insuffi-
cient resources to ensure stateness. This re-
quires developing a hypothesis about smaller 
states ‘importing’ legitimacy from larger states 
and intergovernmental organisations, in whose 
zone of influence they are included. In other 
words, the EU and NATO can provide smaller 
states not only with economic and military re-
sources  but also legitimation ‘resources’ us-
ing their prestige to support the belief of local 
residents that there is no alternative to the cur-
rent political system of social organisation. 
Legitimacy deficit increases the risks of a rift 
between political elites in the Baltic States, 
which can become a prologue to a deep politi-
cal crisis. In these conditions, compensatory 
mechanisms cannot be considered as targeted 
exclusively at broad social strata. They are 
also aimed at political elites, whose consolida-
tion or ‘encapsulation’ is achieved by exag-
gerating external threats and resorting to re-
pressive measures in an attempt to develop an 
ethnonational consensus. These methods are 
used to ensure self-preservation of the Baltic 
States political regimes within the current ide-
ological and institutional configuration. 
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It has been ten years since the Baltic States’ accession to the EU and 
NATO. Over the past decade, the foreign policy of the Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania) has not become less confrontational, despite NATO’s 
security guarantees and European integration. The discriminating ‘alien’ in-
stitution still exists in Latvia and Estonia alongside increasing efforts in the 
politics of memory and exploitation of the idea of the ‘Russian threat’. Lat-
via and Lithuania have introduced criminal charges against the denial of 
‘Soviet occupation’. The Baltics’ political elites strongly oppose negotiations 
with Russia on the implementation of the ‘Eastern Partnership’ programme. 
Over the past decade, the Baltic political elites have met the challenge of 
formulating new positive goals of national development to replace the 
achieved ‘return to the West’ objective. Seeking  a ‘big idea’ necessary for 
the Baltics’ societies facing a difficult socioeconomic situation1, local au-
thorities employ all available — political and ideological — tools, including 
theses about the ‘liberation from the Soviet past’ and ‘Russian threat’2. The 
background to growing critical trends in the legitimacy of the Baltics’ re-
gimes is formed by increasingly explosive international situation. 
S. M. Lipset stresses that legitimacy ‘involves the capacity of a political 
system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society’ [24]. R. Collins ex-
pands this definition stressing that legitimacy is connected with not only the 
enthusiasm and obedience of masses but also the loyalty of political groups. 
Deligitimation is a result of the split between political elites doubting their le-
gitimacy and the transition of masses from alienation to active opposition [11]. 
Legitimacy is not an absolute constant — it is a variable value3. The 
problem of empirical measurement of its level is widely debated in political sci-
ence. Clear approaches to defining the empirical threshold of the legitimacy cri-
sis have not been developed yet. The background of the crisis is  the fact that a 
significant part of population is losing confidence in public institutions [9]. 
However, this definition requires further development and operationalization. 
A loss of confidence does not inevitably entail the toppling of existing power 
groups and the political regime in general. 
A distinctive feature of the legitimacy crisis is that it may not manifest until 
a certain critical moment. It evolves gradually, sometimes unnoticed to even an 
acute observer. Observing the beginning of post-communist transformations in 
the 1990s, J. Pakulski stressed that Eastern Europe’s communist regimes had 
lost their legitimacy almost immediately as protests had swept the countries at 
the turn of the 1990s [27]. However, this conclusion made during the rapid de-
                                                     
1 A useful indicator of the socioeconomic situation is demographic statistics. Ac-
cording to the recent census, Lithuania’s population has decreased by 616,000 peo-
ple (over 17 %), Latvia’s by 600,000 (over 22 %), and Estonia’s by 270,000 (over 
17 %) since 1989. For more detail, see [3].  
2 On the intensification of history of memories in Eastern Europe, see [4]. 
3 H. Linz stresses, ‘No regime is intrinsically legitimate: neither in terms of its com-
mand, nor forever, but probably very few are completely illegitimate and entirely 
based on coercion’ [23; 66]. 
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velopments was situational. The researcher overlooked the critical political pro-
cesses and events taking place in Eastern Europe over several decades. The ab-
sence of revolutions and coups is not indicative of perfect legitimacy of the au-
thorities. It would be a mistake to think that a regime is legitimate just because it 
is not openly challenged, stresses M. Dogan [15]. 
A political crisis resulting in a regime change or political system dysfunc-
tion is the climax of crisis trends, which are shaped by a number of smaller-
scale conflicts and changes in the perception of the authorities by population 
and political groups. A legitimacy crisis can easily turn into an acute political 
crisis as the state loses its international prestige. A deep financial crisis arises 
and the socioeconomic sphere collapses following a split between the elites 
[11]. A combination of internal and external crisis factors aggravates the legit-
imacy crisis. 
This article considers any crisis as a breaking point in the system develop-
ment, when malfunctions make inertial motion impossible, thus bringing the 
system to a ‘fork in the road’. It becomes either more simplified (tending to-
wards destruction) or more complicated. This definition is very broad and it re-
quires further development. However, it can be used for the identification of dif-
ferent stages of the crisis dynamics: 
1) contradictions, accumulated in the course of a system’s functioning turn 
into critical trends in the absence (or due to the weakness) of opposite trends to-
wards the stabilisation of the system in its current form; 
2) gradual deterioration of critical trends reaches the ‘crisis’ mark when the 
system cannot function as it did before; 
3) overcoming the crisis requires destabilisation of the system, which in its 
turn, results in transformations — either simplification or complication of the 
system. 
It makes sense to analyse the choice of variables/indicators that would 
make it possible to observe changes in the level of legitimacy and increas-
ing critical trends until a full-scale political crisis arises. These variables 
are connected with the sources of legitimacy reproduction. The statement 
that, in modern society legitimacy is based on decisions made according to 
standard rules and procedures (traditions), has become a commonplace. 
However, procedures also require legitimation by higher authorities4 justi-
fied by the dominant ideology [6]. In the Baltics, the source of legitimacy 
is the ideology of liberal democracy strongly promoted by the Euro-Atlan-
tic community and embodied in democratic institutions. Therefore, the first 
indicator of the level of legitimacy is confidence in central political insti-
tutions. 
The second major source of legitimacy is effective functioning of politi-
cal institutions in line with citizens’ expectations. A crisis in legitimacy fol-
lowed by a political crisis is a result of the process of institutionalisation lag-
ging behind the society’s increasing expectations [16]. Key indicators of the 
legitimacy level are incidence of corruption and the state of the party system, 
                                                     
4 For instance, US citizens voice increasing discontent with the current functioning 
of political institutions, still expressing general confidence in the institutions them-
selves. For more detail, see [15]. 
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including stability of major political parties. Functioning and support for par-
ty organisations affect the sustainability of the government’s social base [7]. 
The problems of legitimacy of the Baltic political elites should be con-
sidered in the context of the studies of legitimacy in Eastern Europe. As a 
rule, Western political scientists consider a lack of legitimacy in view of 
risks to the liberal democratic model. Yet, the list of urgent issues is not ex-
hausted by the viability of the democratic doctrine. Legitimacy is a neces-
sary condition for the continued functioning of public institutions in general. 
It is worth stressing that the concept of ‘post-communism’ and the theory of 
transitology emerged as early as the previous decade [10]. In Western politi-
cal science, the discussion of the ‘communist legacy’ has been superseded 
by the problems of institutional dysfunctioning of ‘young democracies’ in 
Eastern Europe [13]. 
The focus of research is shifting from the conditions for successful dem-
ocratic transitions to the factors of their future stability. Francis Fukuyama 
questions the influential theory of consolidated democracy — the stage of 
development following successful transfer of power within two democratic 
electoral cycles — stressing the possibility of democratised regimes return-
ing to authoritarianism [14]. T. Carothers argues that ‘an uneasy, precarious 
middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is 
actually the most common political condition today in the developing and 
the post-communist world’ [10]. 
This perspective stresses that definitions of democracy based on formal 
institutions and even successful transfer of power in a democratic election 
are not sufficient, since power can be ‘intercepted’ by informal institutions. 
As a result, democratic institutions and democratic principles can lose their 
decisive influence over decision processes; it can lead to the emergence of 
‘façade democracies’. Excessive attention paid by researchers to the formal 
rules5 obscures the fact that the survival of unstable ‘young democracies’ de-
pends on ‘the ability of the underlying social groups to mobilize and to get 
their way’ [14] when interacting with the power groups. Here, we return to 
the above-formulated thesis that a stable party system, answering the needs 
of the society, plays a central role in legitimacy reproduction. 
Unsteady and weak connections between political parties and the society 
cannot ensure stable reproduction of legitimacy. It is particularly noticeable 
in the countries that recently underwent deep political transformations. As 
V. I. Kovalenko stresses, political elites coming to power in transitional po-
litical periods quickly lose the support of population when democratic trans-
formations fail to solve urgent social problems [2]. The transition from 
‘transformation’ to normal functioning requires the emergence of viable in-
stitutions. However, prerequisites for the formation of such institutions de-
velop over long periods of the society’s political evolution, shaped by its his-
torical experience and political trajectories. 
                                                     
5 This asymmetry can be caused by complex procedures of analysing informal as-
pects of the political process. Such procedures suggest qualitative assessment and 
they are not always compatible with formalised argumentation. 
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Therefore, driving forces behind political transformations preceding their 
emergence are an important factor for assessing the stability of ‘young’ 
democratic institutions. Fukuyama distinguishes between ‘conquered’ and 
‘granted’ democracies, stressing that despite short-term popular mobilisation 
during the ‘velvet revolutions’ in the countries of former communist bloc, 
‘the initial impetus still came from Gorbachev’ [14]. This suggests that East-
ern European democratic institutions are vulnerable, since the society is 
hardly capable of strengthening them and creating stable party systems. 
Therefore, external political and information/propaganda support for these 
institutions in individual countries is of special importance. In these condi-
tions, one cannot ignore the voices of US experts emphasising the need for 
active promotion and protection of democracies in the world [21]. 
In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, experts from the Kennan Institute (US) 
declared the vulnerability of the Baltics’ democratic institutions and stressed 
the need to involve national minorities into the political process6. 
However, protection of democracy suggests the presence of its enemies 
— both external and internal ones, so-called ‘fifth columns’. The democratic 
regime does not collapse, since there is no better alternative to democratic 
reforms, argue optimists [15]. Pessimists invoke numerous historical exam-
ples of declining legitimacy of democratic regimes caused not only by revo-
lutions, military defeats, and political crises but also by small states losing 
political protection of empires [15]. 
With this in mind, let us analyse legitimacy in the context of the Baltic 
States using the key indicators of popular confidence in political institutions, 
incidence of corruption, and the state of the party system. 
In 2001, 50 % of Estonians, 51 % of Latvians, and 59 % of Lithuanians 
believed that public administration would benefit from returning to the 
communist regime or the establishment of a dictatorship [32]. In his study 
into Lithuania’s political culture, the Lithuanian scholar M. Degutis proves 
the thesis about the absence of national conditions for a long-term stability 
of the democratic regime [12]. ‘The survival of the democratic regime in the 
Baltic States should be related to the prospect of the EU membership’, writes 
S. Spurga [35]. 
In view of the above data and sporadic political conflicts7 in the Baltic 
States, the motto of ‘returning to the West’ was an important — and proba-
                                                     
6 Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennan Institute Matthew Rojansky pro-
posed conducting an ‘audit of vulnerabilities in the NATO members' own security 
establishments, politics and societies’ in Eastern Europe. Showing understanding of 
concerns about ‘Russian-backed fifth columns’ (apparently, voiced by the Baltic, 
however, these countries are not explicitly mentioned), US experts believe that the 
countries of the region ‘cannot turn a blind eye to nationalist strains in their domes-
tic politics that demean or ignore the concerns of Russian-speaking minorities and 
Russia itself’. Therefore, it is proposed to increase the inclusiveness of political sys-
tems. For more detail, see [31].  
7 In 1993—2000, eight cabinets changed in Latvia [37]. According to A. Zaiganova, 
there was not a single case of an Estonian government serving the full four-year 
term in 1991—2007. In Lithuania, the 2004 EU accession coincided with a severe 
political crisis as R. Paksas was impeached on corruption charges [38].  
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bly decisive — factor behind the legitimacy of political regimes in the Bal-
tics. After the accession to the EU and NATO, political scientists considered 
it an achievement that the Baltics had not followed the path of Moldavia and 
Yugoslavia [28]. 
In the past 3—5 years, sociological data have been inconclusive. How-
ever, the trends prevalent in the 1990s — early 2000s are still noticeable. 
Over 80 % of the Baltics’ citizens believe that democracy is an adequate sys-
tem of public administration. Nevertheless, 41 % of Lithuanians and 57 % of 
Latvians are convinced that a stronger leader defying the institutions of par-
liament and elections would be a better choice for the country. Moreover, 
10 % of the respondents in Latvia and 6 % in Lithuania would prefer military 
dictatorship to democracy in their country [8]. This is accompanied by mass 
media’s increasingly harsh rhetoric against Russia, which has its own reper-
cussions. In Lithuania, 61.5 % considered Russia an enemy in 2005, and 
72.5 % in 2014 [1]. A number of Lithuanian and Latvian researchers support 
the thesis about the ‘vicious circle of political alienation’, which provides 
fertile ground for populist parties causing the voters’ disappointment in the 
political system [1] 
Current sociological data on popular confidence in political institutions 
in the Baltics make it possible to describe the above trends in more detail. 
Confidence in the key political institutions — the parliament, government, 
and political parties — is well the EU average in Latvia and Lithuania and 
above it in Estonia (see table 1). However, in all the three Baltic States, the 
level of confidence in the EU is above the Union average. 
It is worth mentioning that over the past 2—3 years, the level of confi-
dence in political institutions has increased in the EU countries after the de-
cline observed in 2008—2009 and associated with the economic crisis. 
However, the lack of confidence in political institutions is still rather notice-
able in Lithuania and Latvia (table 1). Despite general low confidence in po-
litical institutions, citizens of the Baltics show a positive attitude towards the 
EU. In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the level of confidence in the EU is 
well above the Union average. 
 
Table 1 
 
Level of distrust in political institutions 
 
 Lithuania Latvia Estonia EU average 
Parliament 84 % 79 % 61 % 69 % 
Government 74 % 75 % 58 % 72 % 
Political parties 85 % 90 % 80 % 82 % 
European Union 35 % 45 % 33 % 58 % 
 
Source: [36]. 
 
In the Baltics, the key indicators of corruption incidence are above the 
EU average (table 2). Empirical studies suggest that Estonia has the lowest 
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corruption incidence in the Baltics. Estonia’s anti-corruption practices set an 
example to other Eastern European countries [22]. However, Lithuania and 
Latvia are still among EU leaders in corruption. 
In 2014, results of a survey on corruption in the EU countries were pub-
lished [34]. The survey ranks Lithuania in the top five as to the proportion of 
respondents convinced that corruption is widespread in their country (95 %, 
surpassed only by Greece with 99 % and Italy with 97 %). Lithuania has the 
largest proportion of respondents across European countries who reported 
knowing someone who takes bribes (35 %). Here, Latvia ranks fourth with 
25 %. Lithuania is also the EU leader in the number of respondents personal-
ly affected by corruption (25 %). Most often the question as to whether it is 
acceptable to offer an official a bribe in return for public services was an-
swered positively by a significant number of respondents in Lithuania (42 % 
of the respondents), whereas Latvia ranked third (38 %). An important indi-
cator is the percepted level of corruption in police and customs. Here, Lithu-
ania and Latvia rank second (63 %) and third (58 %) respectively, being sur-
passed only by Romania (67 %). 
 
Table 2 
 
Tolerance of EU citizens to corruption 
 
 Tolerated, % Inacceptable, % 
Lithuania 62 29 
Latvia 68 26 
Estonia 38 59 
EU average 33 64 
 
Source: [34] 
 
The above data describe the general level of corruption in the Baltics. As 
to politics, over the past years, corruption scandals have erupted more than 
once in all the three countries. A detailed analysis of such cases is beyond 
the scope of this work, therefore we will consider just a few of them. 
In Lithuania, it is worth mentioning the scandal in the Homeland Union 
— Lithuanian Christian Democrats party over corruption in the Garbara-
vičius family — an influential Kaunas clan. A major scandal erupted over 
the actions of the mayor of Vilnius, A. Zuokos. The parliamentary and judi-
cial investigation focused on a number of offences ranging from corruption 
in housing, utilities and real estate fraud to buying votes in the mayoral elec-
tion. Court proceedings — despite the solid evidence — did not result in the 
mayor’s resignation8. He left the office only after failing to win the election 
in 2015. 
                                                     
8 Porkurory pytayutsya pereyti Rubikom [Prosecution to cross the Rubicon] // Ex-
press nedelya. 2008. June, 27. 
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The then President of Latvia V. Zatlers initiated a referendum on the dis-
solution of the Parliament following a series of corruption-related scandals. 
However, the ‘oligarch case’ was not pursued any further. The focus on cor-
ruption caused the category of ‘oligarchs’ to become a key concept in Latvi-
an political science. Oligarchs are often considered key actors in Latvian 
politics [8]. 
In 2013, a major scandal erupted in Estonia over vote rigging, which 
made it possible for ex-Foreign Minister and EP member K. Ojuland to enter 
the governing body of the Estonian Reform Party. Ojuland was expelled 
from the party but she retained her seat in the European Parliament9. 
The above facts reflect the trends, which are also corroborated by a com-
prehensive empirical analysis of citizens’ perception of corruption in politi-
cal institutions (table 3). 
 
Table 3 
 
Corruption perception index by institution10 
(1 — not corrupted, 5 — fully corrupted) 
 
Country 
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Estonia 
2013 3.7 3.1 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.1 3.3 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.6 3.2 
2004 3.5 3.1 2.0 2.8 2.8 1.7 3.1 2.4 3.1 2.7 2.9 n/a 
Latvia 
2013 4.0 3.7 2.3 2.4 3.0 2.1 3.4 2.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.8 
2004 4.2 4.0 2.5 2.4 3.1 2.0 3.7 3.0 4.1 3.6 4.0 n/a 
Lithuania 
2013 4.2 4.3 2.4 2.6 3.3 2.5 3.6 3.2 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.9 
2004 4.2 4.2 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.3 3.5 3.0 4.2 3.8 4.1 n/a 
Finland 
2013 3.4 2.9 1.9 2.4 3.1 2.3 3.3 2.1 2.0 2.4 1.8 2.8 
2004 3.0 2.6 1.6 2.0 2.9 2.3 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.7 n/a 
 
These data on confidence in political institutions and level of corruption 
are indicative of the persistent vulnerability of political regimes in the Bal-
tics. In a number of major indices, the Baltic States rank well below the EU 
average and sometimes below many Eastern European countries. 
                                                     
9 Korruptsiya I poddelka golosov: bolshe vsego kandidatov s tyomym proshlym v 
Lääne-Virumaa [Corruption and vote rigging: most candidates with murky past in 
Lääne-Virumaa] // Delfi. ee. 2015. January, 13. 
10 According to the Global Corruption Barometer by Transparency International, 
2004—2013. For comparison, the table also contains data of a survey carried out in 
Finland. For more detail, see [17]. 
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State-building requires not only free elections and declarations of 
commitment from the political class but also the basic resources of so-
ciety. A high level of corruption — an indicator of instability in the 
state — is not always the main cause of a legitimacy crisis and political 
risks. ‘Rather, the problem is one of insufficient human and material re-
sources’, Francis Fukuyama stresses. ‘Where the democratic opening 
(i. e. transparency and accountability. — V. S.) preceded state reform, the 
result has often been widespread clientelism’ [16]. 
Corruption and deficit of legitimacy are widespread problems at the 
current stage of political developmen not only in young and fragile states, 
but also in stronger ones. The central issue is the presence of counter-
weights that could balance the negative trends. These are political institu-
tions capable of triggering political activity and voicing interests of citi-
zens thus cementing the political community. In modern communities, 
political parties perform this key function. 
The actions of political agents can be institutionalised by different organ-
isations. However, in democratic societies, there is no viable alternative to 
political parties. Recently, discussions have focused on the possibility of so-
cial movements and situational political associations replacing popular par-
ties. However, such structures are not capable of solving major organisation-
al problems of campaigning and voter mobilisation to ensure a stable elec-
tion process. Nor can these problems be solved by trade unions and business 
associations. Therefore, in case of a party system dysfunction, informal insti-
tutions — cliques and clientele, as well as criminal organisations which con-
tribute to the criminalisation of governmental bodies — come to the fore. 
Some symptoms of these processes observed in the Baltics were examined 
above. Hence, a party system is a major mechanism ensuring interaction be-
tween society and ruling elites, capable of sustaining legitimacy through ef-
fective feedback. 
The party systems of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have both sim-
ilarities and differences. In all the three countries, the party systems are 
characterised by weak links between voters and parties and a high degree 
of fragmentation11. In Estonia, the 2000s witnessed a reduction in the par-
ty system fragmentation and relative stabilisation of electoral prefer-
ences. However, the 2015 parliamentary election was marked by increas-
ing fragmentation as compared to the 2011 electoral cycle — six parties 
won seats in the parliament compared to four in 201112. It is worth stress-
                                                     
11 This assessment is based on an analysis of voter turnout, popular confidence in 
parties and party membership, and stability of voters’ preferences. The party sys-
tems of Lithuania and Latvia are well below not only the Western European, but 
also EU average, whereas the situation in Estonia is slightly better. For more de-
tail, see [33]. 
12 The 2015 Parliamentary Elections in Estonia. Rewarding the Squirrels. Baltic 
worlds. March 9, 2015. [e-resource]. URL: http://balticworlds.com/rewarding-the-
squirrels/ (accessed on 25.03.2015). 
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ing that a number of Baltic scholars, while emphasising, a high fragmen-
tation degree, weak institutional development and ‘commercialisation’ of 
the Baltic party system, stress the related risks of increased susceptibility 
to Russian influence13. 
A feature common to all the Baltic States is party split over attitudes to 
the communist past. Political parties opposing the doctrine of ‘Soviet occu-
pation’ are automatically labelled as ‘communist’14 or ‘pro-Russian’ parties. 
In the Baltics, party struggle is often based on ‘antagonising Russia’ [20] 
aimed not only at marginalising opponents, but also at justifying their own 
political decisions. 
The party systems of Latvia and Estonia are split along ethnic lines. As a 
result, opposition parties representing a significant proportion of voters, in-
cluding the Russian-speaking minority, are not allowed to join the ruling co-
alition or government. V. Pettai calls this phenomenon ‘ostracism’ [29]. 
J. Rozenvalds describes this situation as ‘encapsulation’ of ruling elites [5]. 
In Lithuania, the ethnic split is less pronounced and the divide runs 
along the lines of left/right wing pattern (which is rather strained in Lithu-
ania) as well as the attitudes to the Soviet past, Russia and, partly, to the 
Polish minority. One can argue that the Ukraine crisis has had a strong 
consolidating effect on a negative foundation. Today, Lithuania’s major 
political parties (conservatives and social democrats) — who used to be 
considered system-building opponents, proposed different agendas, includ-
ing views on Russia — have become a monolith as to a wide range of for-
eign policy issues. 
In Latvia, the ruling coalition employs the ideology of ethnic na-
tionalism. To compete with the ‘Harmony’ party, which is supported by 
the Russian-speaking population, the ruling coalition uses not only its 
own party organisations but also combinations of formal and informal 
mechanisms beyond the party system. The ‘Harmony’ party (earlier, the 
                                                     
13 For more detail, see [18]. It is worth noting that these problems are discussed by 
both researchers and high-ranking politicians. In 2015, Andris Bērziņš, President 
of Latvia, said, ‘our party system cannot be called strong. It is being developed. 
The party system is not deeply rooted in the civil society, thus most citizens are 
right to think that the parties do not represents the interests of the society’ (Presi-
dent: The era of Latvian parties is just too short // Latvijas Sabiedriskie mediji. 
2015. February 23). 
14 In effect, the party struggle is increasingly focused on attitudes towards Russia, 
whereas the adjective ‘pro-Russian’ is considered derogatory. Yet, the notion of 
‘communism’ still plays the role of an important marker, a division line between dif-
ferent political forces in Lithuania. Communism is legally equated to Nazism. 
Whereas an open declaration of Communist views can lead to legal prosecution, an-
ti-communist statements have become a widespread populist technique. The division 
into 'post-communists' (represented by the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania 
and later by the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania) and ‘anti-communists’ (pri-
marily, the Homeland Union as a successor to Sajudis) is employed in the works of a 
number of Lithuanian researchers. For more detail, see [30]. 
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Harmony Centre) having won the 2011 and 2014 parliamentary elections 
did not gain the right to form the ruling coalition. This makes it possible 
for several right conservative parties to create a coalition and exclude the 
‘Harmony’ with its alternative left-centre agenda from forming the gov-
ernment. In 2011, leaders of conservative parties demanded that the Har-
mony Centre acknowledge ‘Soviet occupation’ and recognise Latvian as 
the only official language in order to be given access to the ruling coali-
tion [8]. This requirement has not been waived. Latvia’s ruling nationalist 
parties demand that the social democratic ‘Harmony’ accept their ‘red 
lines’ (acknowledgement of ‘occupation’, etc.) to ‘freeze’ the domestic 
political conflict and isolate the competitor that enjoys strong support 
from voters. 
A similar situation has developed in Estonia. The Estonian Centre Party 
is left out of the governing coalition despite coming second in the 2011 
(23.3 %) and the 2015 (24.8 %)15 elections, following closely the Estonian 
Reform party. However, unlike the ‘Harmony’ in Latvia, the party has con-
trol over the capital’s municipality. 
An analysis of the above data makes it possible to speak of a sig-
nificant deficit of legitimacy characteristic of the Baltics’ political re-
gimes. A lack of legitimacy and low confidence in political institutions 
accompanied by high incidence of corruption and strong informal institu-
tions increase risks of political destabilisation. The weakness of party 
systems and political institutions, discrimination of national minorities 
limit opportunities for the political system’s self-regulation in terms of 
legitimacy. Political elites are faced with the challenge of creating com-
pensatory mechanisms that could reverse the negative trends of declining 
legitimacy. 
In this situation, priority is given to the justification of Latvian and Es-
tonian discriminatory institutions of popular non-citizenship limiting the 
political and economic rights of national minorities. This priority is closely 
connected with the need to convey legitimacy upon the political groups 
brought to power by social movements — the Baltics’ ‘popular fronts’. 
These organisations were protest movements creating ‘parallel government 
bodies’, which required a solid ideological basis for them to secure posi-
tions in power. 
Ethnic nationalism became the major programme and ideological basis 
for the new political elites. The declared doctrine of continuity of states and 
popularisation of the ‘Soviet occupation’ ideologeme were used to strength-
en the legitimacy of the ethnocratic model of democracy in the Baltics. Inte-
gration into the Euro-Atlantic structures under the ‘return to Europe’ motto 
played the role of a ‘positive’ political programme. 
                                                     
15 According to the Election Commission of Estonia (“Upcoming elections in Esto-
nia: 2015 Elections to the Riigikogu”. [E-resource]. URL: http://vvk. ee/general-
info/ (accessed on 25.03.2015).  
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In this context, the ‘securitisation’ discourse gained wide currency. Ar-
guments focused on defence against the ‘Russian threat’ were used to win 
support for accession to the EU and NATO and to secure a stronger position 
in negotiations with Western elites. This resulted in the concept of the Bal-
tics being an ‘outpost’ of the West at the border with the ‘Eastern neigh-
bour’. This topic is still much talked in the Baltics’ mass media. 
Another compensatory mechanism is institutionalisation of the poli-
tics of memory. A number of museums, research centres, and official 
commissions dealing with ‘Soviet occupation’ and ‘victims of two totali-
tarian systems’ — which is often reduced to equating Communism with 
Nazism with an emphasis on the ‘historical guilt’ of the former — have 
been established in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia under the govern-
ments’ aegis. These efforts might have contributed to the justification of 
ethnic nationalism and ‘securitisation’. However, over time, the politics 
of memory has developed its own logic under the influence of persistent 
and often successful attempts of the Baltic elites to contribute to the Eu-
ropean politics of memory and export domestic practices to other region 
(for instance, Ukraine). In the Baltics’ domestic policy, consistent devel-
opment of historical topics had to compensate for the ‘deficient’ history 
of sovereign statehood. As a result, the topic of ‘Soviet occupation’ be-
came somewhat of a marker for elite groups drawing a line between the 
supporters of the ruling regimes and the ‘others’, thus contributing to the 
consolidation of the ruling elite based on ethnic nationalism. 
However, these compensatory mechanisms have certain limitations. 
Administrative tools and public support shaped the direction of the poli-
tics of memory and ideological activities and stimulated them. However, 
they faced a serious problem of producing viable content16. The situation 
in the Baltics proves J. Habermas’s thesis that ‘there can be 
no administrative creation of meaning’ [6]. The inefficiency of the poli-
tics of memory is manifested in the ‘criminalisation’ of denial of ‘Soviet 
                                                     
16 Primarily, this concerns the short history of the Baltics’ sovereignty, the problem 
of dealing with numerous facts of collaborationism with the Nazi regime. As a re-
sult, special attention is paid to emphasising the external threat coming from the  
others (the ‘Eastern neighbour’). The Norwegian scholar Øyvind Jæger describes the 
situation in the Baltics as follows: ‘…the invoking of historical memory as legitimi-
sation of state-building enterprises reproduces the perception of threat and perpetu-
ates the discourse of danger. A rationale for widespread securitisation is provided, 
and a precarious Baltic state identity is (re)produced. Precisely because identity is 
precarious and elusive and because state institutions are weak, faltering or lacking, 
the entire state project is perceived as vulnerable. The discourse of danger is instru-
mental in propping up state institutions, borders and identity to mitigate the sense of 
vulnerability’ [19]. A similar assessment of the situation in Lithuania against the 
background of the recent international developments is given by the Lithuanian his-
torian Algimantas Kasparavičius. He stresses that ‘a search for enemies does not 
suggest political and cultural maturity of the state and society’ (Historian: Lithuani-
ans stimulate information war themselves // Delfi. lt. 2014. June 2). 
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occupation’. Relevant laws imposing criminal responsibility on individu-
als denying ‘Soviet occupation’ were adopted in Lithuania and Latvia in 
2010 and 2014 respectively. 
These innovations are widely discussed. Yet, they are not the only 
measures that can be called repressive compensatory mechanisms. Tradi-
tionally, their implementation has been the realm of the Baltics’ law en-
forcement and special services. The ‘securitisation discourse’ inevitably 
suggests strong presence of special services in the country’s public sphere. 
A detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this study. Here, we 
will analyse only several examples describing the whole picture. Estonia’s 
Internal Security Service (KaPo) regularly publishes reports listing so-
called ‘public enemies’17. Moreover, KaPo organises workshops for social 
science teachers18. In Lithuania, special services use similar methods (pub-
lic reports by the State Security Department focused primarily on the 
‘threat from the East’ are actively promoted in mass media), but they do it 
more ostentatiously. Similar reports listing ‘disloyal individuals’ in politi-
cal circles, mass media, and human rights organisations are published by 
Lithuanian special services — the Constitution Protection Bureau and Se-
curity Police. In 2014, Lithuania’s law enforcement structures conducted 
searches in Russian schools of Vilnius prompted by their students’ trips to 
Russian summer camps19. In 2015, public attention was drawn to the police 
searching the flats of famous Lithuanian journalists, artists, and scholars 
suspected of ‘disseminating anti-Lithuanian information’. 
Based on this analysis, one can draw certain conclusions as to the legiti-
macy of the Baltics’ political regimes and the prospects of their develop-
ment. Deficit of legitimacy of the Baltics’ political regimes becomes evident 
when analysing certain empirical indices — primarily, low confidence in po-
litical institutions and high incidence of corruption. This situation is charac-
teristic of Eastern Europe in general. However, the Baltic States show a 
                                                     
17 In 2012, Vice Mayor of Tallinn Mihhail Kõlvart got on the list of ‘public ene-
mies’ (‘Kõlvart: I will not put up with my name mentioned by KaPo and the mo-
tion of censure) // Delfi. ee. 2012. April 18). The 2011—2012 public report of the 
Estonian Internal Security Service accused member of the Estonian Parliament 
Yana Toom of anti-state activity manifested in support for education in the Rus-
sian language. In 2014, the appeal court ruled in favour of Yana Toom. The Inter-
nal Security Services had to issue a public refutation of the allegations against the 
politician. However, the Court did not rule for psychological damage compensa-
tion and the withdrawal of published reports. (Arguments used in court to secure 
the victory of Toom over the Internal Security Services // Delfi. ee. 2014. October 
27). At the end of 2010, just before the parliamentary election, the KaPo published 
a report containing unfounded allegations about the chair of the Estonian Centre 
Party Edgar Savisaar receiving money from Russian businesspeople for the elec-
tion campaign (KaPo publishes report on Savisaar financed from Russia // Delfi. 
ee. 2010. December 21).  
18 ‘KaPo to instruct teachers in a top-secret atmosphere’ // Delfi. ee. 2015. March 19. 
19 Two Russian schools searcher in Vilnius // Delfi. lt. 2014. December 3. 
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number of specific features. The problem of low confidence in political insti-
tution is especially acute in Lithuania and Latvia. A high degree of fragmen-
tation and weak support for party systems observed in the Baltics compli-
cates the reproduction of legitimacy in a way traditional for democratic soci-
eties. The discriminatory institutions of ‘non-citizenship’ existing in Lithua-
nia and Estonia aggravate the problem of legitimacy regulation preventing 
large social groups from participating in political processes and voicing their 
interest. The political systems of these states are neither balanced nor stable, 
whereas the election mechanisms do not ensure real representation. In total, 
these phenomena make it possible to speak of increasing trends towards a 
deeper crisis in the legitimacy of the Baltic regimes fraught with ‘borrowing’ 
legitimacy through exploiting the resource of external threat and leading to 
political destabilisation. The only obstacle to the negative trends is high 
popular confidence in the EU institutions. 
Deficit of legitimacy results in a wider use of coercion by the political 
regime [15]. Conceptualising this dependence makes it possible to distin-
guish between ‘despotic and ‘infrastructural’ types of power [25]. Infrastruc-
tural power does not resort to coercion ensuring effective public participa-
tion in the life of the society through popular confidence in the authorities 
acting in the interests of the society [26]. The weakness of institutional 
mechanisms of legitimacy reproduction requires active participation of pow-
er groups through administrative methods and ‘artificial’ consolidation of 
social groups and political elites in the framework of existing regimes. This 
trend is manifested in a wider use of compensatory mechanisms by the Bal-
tics’ political elites — developing the image of a ‘victim nation’ by means of 
the politics of memory and images of ‘Russian threat’ and ‘a besieged for-
tress’. These efforts are justified by a combination of ethnic nationalism and 
the democratic discourse, cemented by formal institutions and supported 
through active and open participation of law enforcement agencies and spe-
cial services in social and political processes. 
It makes sense to analyse the problem of legitimacy in the Baltics not on-
ly from the perspective of threats to democratic institutions, but also in the 
context of weakness of public institutions and a lack of resources for ensur-
ing statehood20. Therefore, there is a need to examine the hypothesis of small 
countries ‘importing’ legitimacy resources from large states and intergov-
ernmental associations, in whose zone of influence they are located. In other 
words, the EU and NATO can provide small states with economic and mili-
tary resources, as well as with those of legitimation thus supporting the pop-
ular conviction that there is no alternative to the current political system. 
The deficit of legitimacy increases the risk of a split in the Baltics’ 
political elites. It can be a prologue to a deep political crisis. In these 
                                                     
20 F. Fukuyama describes this problem as follows: ‘There are, however, many neo-
patrimonial states that pretend to be modern polities, but these in fact constitute rent-
sharing kleptocracies run for the private benefit of the insiders’ [16]. 
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conditions, compensatory mechanisms can be considered as aimed at 
broad social groups. They are also applied to political elites, whose con-
solidation/‘encapsulation’ is achieved through exploiting the topic of ex-
ternal threat and resorting to repressive measures aimed to create the eth-
nic national ‘consensus’ of elites. These methods are used to preserve the 
current ideological and institutional configuration of the Baltic political 
regimes. 
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